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As a social problem involving a wide range of objects, targeted poverty alleviation governance needs to clearly define stakeholders
and identify their behaviour choices, so as to seek a multiagent collaborative governance strategy, and strive to jointly promote the
realization of a targeted poverty alleviation goals in an atmosphere to win-win cooperation and benefit sharing. By constructing a
three-subject evolutionary game model of local government, social organization, and poverty group in the process of targeted
poverty alleviation, this paper discusses the influence of their behavioural decisions on multisubject collaborative governance of
targeted poverty alleviation and selects samples to carry out simulation experiments on the model. )e results show that, first,
superior government support has little effect on the evolution of tripartite competition, and the conclusion is inconsistent with the
general cognition. However, the enhancement of support from local governments and social organizations can effectively promote
the transformation of the willingness of the poor groups to cooperate. Second, a modest increase in the punishment of social
organizations and poor groups can have a binding effect on the behavioural strategy choices of both sides and ultimately promote
the process of targeted poverty alleviation. )ird, the increase in the benefits of social organizations and poor groups can
significantly improve the willingness of both sides to cooperate, so the “endogenous driving force” of the poor groups should be
enhanced to achieve the Pareto optimal state of targeted poverty alleviation.
1. Introduction
At the “2015 Poverty Reduction and Development Forum,”
President Xi Jinping stated that “we have been committed to
mobilizing the whole society to participate, giving full play to
China’s institutional advantages, and building a pattern of
great poverty alleviation coordinated by the government,
society, and market, and forming a social poverty alleviation
system with diverse participants that involves cross-regions,
cross-departments, cross-units, and the whole society” [1].
To solve the problem of collaborative governance of diverse
subjects is the key to poverty alleviation. )is not only needs
external help from the government and social groups but
also needs to rely on the endogenous driving force of the
poor groups to get rid of poverty, so as to realize the benign
interaction between “inside” and “outside.” At present, in
the process of targeted poverty alleviation, the poor groups
are interrelated through the realization of poverty alleviation
goals, forming a collaborative network. However, all the
subjects, from the perspective of their own interests, do not
form synergy through poverty alleviation goals. At present,
taking targeted measures to alleviate poverty has gone from
“fighting alone” to “unity and cooperation.” It is imperative
to create a multidimensional interconnected pattern for
collaborative governance by multiple subjects. In fact, in the
process of targeted poverty alleviation, no substantial
progress and breakthroughs have been made in the col-
laborative governance of diverse subjects, nor has a sys-
tematic and comprehensive collaborative mechanism been
formed [2, 3]. )erefore, in order to effectively promote the
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new pattern of coordinated governance of multiple subjects
in accurate poverty alleviation, it is necessary to find out the
key factors that affect each interest subject and clarify the
action path of these key factors, so as to ultimately promote
the cooperation of each interest subject. )erefore, the main
problems to be solved in this paper are as follows:
(1) Analyze the relationship and game strategy selection
between local government, social organizations, and
poverty group in the process of poverty alleviation
and explore the factors influencing the cooperation
evolution of local government, social organization,
and poverty group taking the support of the local
government as environmental factors.
(2) Based on the premise of limited rationality, the
process precision of poverty alleviation is regarded as
a gradual learning process of dynamic construction
of precision in the process of poverty alleviation,
poverty group in local government, social organi-
zation, and the evolutionary game model and found
the key influencing factors by setting the parameters
and solving the models.
(3) )e stability strategy selection of the three parties in
the process of targeted poverty alleviation is studied
by analyzing the evolutionary game equilibrium and
stability of local governments, social organizations,
and poor groups in the process of targeted poverty
alleviation. )en, through the changes of the upper
government financial support, the benefit of the
poverty group, and other parameters, Matlab is used
for simulation analysis, which more intuitively re-
flects the game evolution trend of local governments,
social organizations, and poor group in the process
of accurate poverty alleviation and puts forward
reasonable countermeasures and suggestions to
provide decision-making basis for government
departments.
In view of this, there are three main differences in this
study. First, based on the limited rational perspective of
participants, the paper introduces the parameters of gov-
ernment funding, income of poor groups, etc., constructs the
evolutionary game model of multiagent collaborative gov-
ernance for targeted poverty alleviation, and solves the
equilibrium strategy. Second, it focuses on the key factors
affecting the selection of multiagent collaborative gover-
nance strategy. Again, the evolutionary characteristics and
evolution trends of the group in the process of precision
poverty alleviation and multiagent collaborative governance
are observed through simulation. According to this con-
clusion, it can more accurately and objectively reflect the
strategy choice of the game players in reality and has a
reference value and guiding significance for the decision-
making of multiagent targeted poverty alleviation and col-
laborative governance.
)e rest of the study is arranged as follows. Section 2
discusses the relevant literature of collaborative governance
and targeted poverty alleviation and puts forward the in-
novation of this work. In Section 3, the problem description
of the model and the assumption of related parameters are
introduced in detail. Section 4 studies the gradual stability of
multiagent through the construction and analysis of income
function. Section 5 analyzes the evolution characteristics and
trend of the group in the process of multiagent collaborative
governance through simulation. Section 6 summarizes the
research of this paper and puts forward relevant counter-
measures and suggestions.
2. Literature
International experience shows that multiagent coordinated
governance can improve the level of poverty. Linkov and
Trump denoted the criticality of collaborative and multi-
stakeholder governance for major challenges such as poverty
[4], while Newman et al. framed collaborative governance as
a function of public participation [5]. Linkov’s work further
unpacks the various notations of collaborative and multi-
stakeholder governance for extreme system complexity and
uncertainty (Linkov et al.) [6]. Jessoula studied the effec-
tiveness of multiagent collaborative poverty alleviation from
the perspective of multilevel social structure in Europe [7].
Khumalo advocated a multistakeholder approach to the
challenge of poverty and reconsidered the structural issue of
perpetuating poverty [8]. Sharma’s innovative financing
mechanisms engaging diverse stakeholders for developing
poverty reduction strategies have been engineered as pos-
sible neoinstitutional structures to counter the world’s most
daunting problems [9]. Ferdinand et al. illustrated the need
for multistakeholder partnerships to reduce vulnerability
and enhance the resilience of communities through the
Caribbean Sea case [10]. Eberlei pointed out that poverty
reduction strategy (PRS) is based on the broad participation
of internal and external stakeholders, including parliament,
civil society organizations, representatives of the private
sector, and other stakeholders at the national and local levels
[11].
Most of the research on collaborative governance for
targeted poverty alleviation focuses on four aspects, namely,
governance dilemma, governance mode, governance path,
and governance practice:
(1) Research on the dilemma of targeted poverty alle-
viation and collaborative governance: although the
holistic governance theory provides an inspiring idea
for the innovation of poverty alleviation work
mechanism, there is still a dilemma of “fragmenta-
tion” in the coordinated governance of targeted
poverty alleviation in China. He and Chen [12]
pointed out that the local government functions in
China and the complexity of the rural poor gover-
nance lead to the present situation of fragmentation
governance of public services, which in turn makes
poverty alleviation and the allocation of resources for
poverty alleviation “fragmented.” Fu Canliang [13],
based on questionnaires and interview data, exam-
ined and analyzed the fragmentation of targeted
identification, targeted assistance, targeted man-
agement, and targeted assessment in the
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implementation of targeted poverty alleviation pol-
icies. Leng et al. [14] pointed out that, due to in-
formation asymmetry, the practice of targeted
poverty alleviation in China is faced with three major
problems. )at is, the moral hazard between gov-
ernments at all levels and the objects of assistance,
disconnection between supply and demand from the
public and the objects of assistance, and fragmen-
tation of poverty alleviation caused by non-
coordination of multiple subjects. Yang [15] believed
that the current rural poverty alleviation work in
China is confronted with such problems as the lack
of benign interaction between institutions, the lack
of collaborative participation among the main bodies
of poverty alleviation, the lack of collaborative
linkage among functional departments, and the lack
of effective integration of poverty alleviation re-
sources and the fragmentation of poverty alleviation
work performance evaluation, which affect the
poverty alleviation effect.
(2) Research on the collaborative governance model for
targeted poverty alleviation: China’s traditional,
unidirectional, passive, and extensive mode of
poverty management leads to low poverty alleviation
efficiency. Zhuang et al. [16] proposed the five-in-
one poverty governance model of “government-
market-society-community-farmer household”, and
discussed how to ensure the effective implementa-
tion of targeted poverty alleviation from the aspects
of accurate identification, assistance, management,
assessment, interest connection, and social mobili-
zation. Ma [17] provided new ideas for the imple-
mentation of targeted poverty alleviation in the new
era by defining the mission of targeted poverty al-
leviation in industry and government partners,
building partnerships, cultivating mutual trust and
implementing incentives, and strengthening the
government network governance capacity. Xu et al.
[18] analyzed the game relationship between the
poor, the nonpoor, the local government, and the
superior government in the process of precise
poverty alleviation and proposed to improve the
coordination model among the government, market,
and society. Lin [19] proposed to build a diversified
poverty alleviation model actively participated by the
government, society, and the poor population and to
establish and improve the coordination mechanism
among poverty alleviation subjects, poverty allevia-
tion resource integration mechanism, and accurate
poverty alleviation assessment mechanism. Mo [20]
analyzed the targeted poverty alleviation governance
model, transformation from the aspects of poverty
alleviation, accurate way of poverty alleviation,
precise subjects, and precise process and pointed out
that an accurate path to break the management of
poverty alleviation is to adhere to the people-cen-
tered concept, construct the comprehensive full of
precision mechanism, refine government-led
diversified participation pattern, and carry out the
value orientation of new development concept.
(3) Research on the path to coordinated governance of
targeted poverty alleviation: in view of the plight of
targeted poverty alleviation under the framework of
collaborative governance analysis, Chinese experts
and scholars have made positive and beneficial
discussions on its governance path. Xie and Liu [21]
analyzed the predicaments of poverty in the inter-
provincial marginal regions and pointed out that it
was necessary to introduce the holistic governance
analysis framework and adopt holistic governance
approaches such as constructing the goal orientation,
subject structure, institutional system, and cross-
border cooperation of poverty governance in the
interprovincial marginal regions. Liu and He [22]
believed that the current targeted poverty alleviation
of the association would gradually go towards the
coordinated targeted poverty alleviation, and the
realization of the coordinated targeted poverty al-
leviation required the coordination of poverty alle-
viation information, the coordination of poverty
alleviation system, the coordination of poverty al-
leviation culture, and the cultivation of good social
capital. Shen [23] pointed out that targeted poverty
alleviation is essentially a practice of refined social
governance, which should also be integrated into
governance concepts such as decentralization, co-
operation, and participation. Based on the rural
system, the government, the public, communities,
enterprises, and the object of poverty alleviation
should be fully mobilized to solve poverty through
factor introduction. He and Liu [24] pointed out that
there was a theoretical fit between the multiple co-
ordinated precision, poverty alleviation, and social
capital. Good social capital is the premise and
foundation for the realization of multiple coordi-
nated precision poverty alleviation, and it is neces-
sary to transform traditional social capital and invest
modern social capital to promote the realization of
multiple coordinated precision poverty alleviation.
Chen and Li [25] proposed the path of targeted
poverty alleviation under the collaborative system,
which established a cross-precise object identifica-
tion mechanism, searched for the prevention
mechanism of poverty alleviation by equalization of
basic public services, and innovated the poverty
alleviation mechanism by classification management
of multiple subjects.
(4) Research on the practice of coordinated governance
for targeted poverty alleviation: the targeted and
holistic governance of poverty alleviation has also
made some achievements in practice. Jin and Ding
[26] provided empirical evidences for the con-
struction of multiple collaborative poverty allevia-
tion mechanisms of government, market, and society
based on the case study of “Jinsha model.” Guan [27]
took collaborative governance as the analytical
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framework, deeply analyzed the prominent influ-
encing factors of targeted poverty alleviation work in
Guangxi, and promoted the readjustment and
deepening of the mechanism and mode of targeted
poverty alleviation work from the aspects of process
synergy, system synergy, subject synergy, and
technology synergy. Wang and Li [28] believed that
it was necessary to coordinate the three poverty
alleviation systems of special projects, industry, and
society at the two levels of overall promotion and
precise individual assistance, so as to find the key
path of poverty alleviation and alleviation. Zhan [29],
based on the analytical framework of collaborative
governance and on-the-spot investigation of S vil-
lage, T village, and R village, summarized the diffi-
culties in identifying the poverty-stricken marginal
groups, realizing the difficult dynamic management,
imprecise assistance, insufficient social participation,
and material assessment in the targeted rural poverty
alleviation, and put forward the future work for
causes of trouble of path optimization. Mu and Pan
[30] started with the mechanism analysis of gov-
ernment-market poverty alleviation development,
combined with the practical cases of poverty alle-
viation development in Guizhou province, and
conducted a preliminary discussion on the govern-
ment-market double-oriented poverty alleviation
development mechanism.
Targeted poverty alleviation (poverty alleviation) has
always been the focus of experts and scholars, but relatively
few studies have been made on the game in the process of
targeted poverty alleviation. (1) )e game of poverty alle-
viation between the government and poor groups or other
poverty alleviation subjects. Based on the theoretical per-
spective of social interaction theory, Fang Jin explored the
interactive relationship between the government and social
organizations in the field of rural poverty governance by
means of the method of cross-comparison analysis in [31].
By establishing the evaluation function of the comprehen-
sive prospect value, Huang Haitang formed a dynamic
evolutionary game model between the government and
enterprises in the process of poverty alleviation and de-
velopment and established a reasonable mechanism for
poverty alleviation and development by the government and
enterprises [32]. Tian et al. analyzed the possible information
asymmetry between the government and the poor group,
resulting in the emergence of interest conflicts, analyzed the
conditions affecting the poverty alleviation cooperation, and
tried to find a new poverty alleviation coordination mech-
anism between the government and the poor group [33, 34].
(2) Poverty alleviation game between multiple subjects.
Under the current system of our country, the mode of
collaborative poverty alleviation with multisubject partici-
pation is gradually formed. It belongs to the stage of par-
ticipatory poverty alleviation [35] from 2001 to 2010, relying
on policies to emphasize participatory assistance [36, 37].
Subsequently, the participants of poverty alleviation policies
are gradually extended by local governments, social
organizations, and many other units to implement the
mobilization type of poverty alleviation development [38].
At the same time, Liu et al. subdivided the roles of the
government into the central government and local gov-
ernment groups, constructed a three-party game between
the central government, the local government, and the poor
groups, and obtained the strategic profit and loss of each
participant in the game [39–43].
It has been proved that the targeted poverty alleviation
model featuring multiple linkages involving the participa-
tion of poverty groups, governments, and enterprises can
promote poverty alleviation, leading to the multisubject
poverty alleviation cooperation [44–49]. However, the key
problem of multisubject participation in poverty alleviation
is to solve the conflict of interest among participants and
seek a stable and balanced state. )erefore, the game of
poverty alleviation among multiple subjects arises at the
historic moment. Yu et al. constructed multiplayer game
models based on game theory and analyzed how to for-
mulate a reasonable and scientific accurate poverty allevi-
ation system by using the optimal solution [50–53].
To sum up, in recent years, the research on collaborative
governance of multiple subjects has become a hot topic for
experts and scholars, and rich research results have been
achieved. However, from the perspective of the content of
the study, it mainly focuses on the profit and loss analysis of
the poverty alleviation strategy involving multiple subjects
and does not use game theory to deeply study and solve the
conflicts among multiple subjects. In related studies, some
scholars have explored the possibility of a collaborative
governance models of multiple subjects, but there is still a
lack of powerful analytical tools.
3. Problem Description and
Parameter Hypothesis
Evolutionary game theory is a theory combining game
theory analysis with dynamic evolutionary process analysis,
which is defined as a dynamic equilibrium [54]. Nowadays,
economists use evolutionary game theory to analyze the
influencing factors in the formation of social habits, norms,
institutions, or institutions and explain their formation
process and have also made remarkable achievements
[55–60]. )e basic idea of the evolutionary game is that the
players are not super rational, and it is impossible to find the
optimal equilibrium point in every game. It aims to reach the
equilibrium through trial and error by repeated games.)us,
the best strategy for game players is to imitate and improve
on the best strategy for themselves and others in the past.
)rough long-term simulation and improvement, all players
tend to a certain stable strategy (as shown in Figure 1).
As described in the evolutionary game model, as a
limited rational person, the cooperation and competition
between local governments, social organizations, and pov-
erty groups in the process of targeted poverty alleviation
need to constantly revise and improve the behavioural
strategies through the recognition of the cooperative be-
haviour rules of targeted poverty alleviation and finally
obtain the satisfactory benefits. )erefore, in the practice of
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targeted poverty alleviation, local governments, social or-
ganizations, and poor groups are assumed to be rational
people who pursue their own independent interest appeals
to maximize their own interests. Under the hypothesis of
limited rationality, the cooperative governance model of
local government, social organization, and poverty group
based on evolutionary game can be constructed to study the
cooperative relationship and behavioural strategy.
)e subjects involved are as follows.
(1) Local government: local government is defined as the
general term of a government organization that
manages the affairs of a national administrative re-
gion. It is the intermediate link between the central
government, provincial government, district-level
government, township government, and village
government, and it is the basic administrative region
for the overall economic and social development.
(2) Social organization: social organization is one of the
three elements of public relations. In a narrow sense,
it is a public activity group that achieves a certain
goal according to a certain purpose and system. For
example, enterprises, factories, schools, and
hospitals.
According to the type of organization, social orga-
nizations can bezx divided into four categories. )e
specific contents are shown in Table 1.
)e social organizations studied in this paper belong to
the category of competitive profit-making organizations,
which will pursue the maximization of their own interests to
ensure long-term development.
(3) Poverty group: poverty group, in the broad sense,
refers to an impoverished household and impov-
erished village.
Generally, according to the definition of the scope
of the poverty group, the standard can be divided
into Table 2. However, the specific situation should
be based on local conditions to visit the investi-
gation, in order to ensure that the specific situation
analysis.
3.1. Basic Assumptions. Suppose the game participants and
strategies are local government (active cooperation and
passive treatment), social organizations (participating in or
not participating in poverty alleviation), and poverty groups
(active cooperation and passive treatment). )ere are two
behavioural strategies for local government. One is to ac-
tively cooperate and comprehensively supervise poverty
alleviation. )rough self-regulation, social organizations
actively participate in poverty alleviation and the poverty
groups actively support poverty alleviation. )e other is that
local governments have taken a passive approach to poverty
alleviation with inadequate oversight. )ere are two
behavioural strategies for social organization. One is to
actively participate in poverty alleviation and help poverty
groups to get rid of poverty as soon as possible. )e other is
the lack of initiative to help, which means staying out of the
situation and failing to play a benign role in the model.
Similarly, there are two behavioural strategies for the poverty
groups. One is to actively cooperate with the poverty alle-
viation work of local government and social organizations.
)e other strategy is that it does not support or cooperate
with poverty alleviation work and lacks internal impetus for
poverty alleviation.
In addition, local governments, social organizations, and
poverty groups are all limited rational persons. In the
process of getting rid of poverty, the poor groups pursue the
maximization of their own benefits. However, local gov-
ernments and social organizations need to pay the cost of
poverty alleviation in the process of targeted poverty alle-
viation. If the poverty group is not lifted out of poverty, local
governments and social organizations will have to pay a huge
cost. )erefore, local governments and social organizations
aim to minimize the loss of social benefits. Under the choice
of positive and negative treatment strategies of local gov-
ernments, social organizations and poor groups improve the
relevance gains and losses of targeted poverty alleviation
through cooperation. )erefore, this paper only studies the
situation that social organizations and poor groups will
generate negative gains when one party does not cooperate,
and the relevance negative gains of local governments at this
time can be ignored.
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3.2. Setting of Relevant Income Parameters. Local govern-
ments, social organizations, and poverty groups are always
relatively stable within a certain region, and the probability
of local governments choosing cooperative strategies at t
time is x(t), while the proportion of social organizations and
poor groups choosing cooperative strategies is y(t) and z(t)
respectively, which satisfies 0≤ x(t)≤ 1, 0≤y(t)≤ 1, and
0≤ z(t)≤ 1.
)e game relationship in the coordinated governance of
multiple subjects of targeted poverty alleviation is relatively
complex. )ere are both cooperation and competition. )e
factors affecting the choice of behaviour subjects’ strategies
involve many aspects. In this paper, the relevant factors of
cooperative competition among the government, social
organizations, and poverty groups are searched for the lit-
erature. )e relevant summary is shown in Table 3:
)erefore, according to the existing research results, this
paper takes these main factors as the main parameters of the
model to build the evolutionary game model of multiagent
collaborative governance of targeted poverty alleviation. )e
relevant benefit parameters are set as follows.
As for the local government, C1 is the support provided by
the superior government for the local government to actively
alleviate poverty, such as funds, projects, and special subsidies
for poverty alleviation; C2 is the cost for local governments in
the process of targeted poverty alleviation; When the three
parties are active in poverty alleviation, the external benefits
brought by local governments due to poverty alleviation is C3,
such as environmental improvement and sustainable industrial
development;C4 refers to the loss of opportunity cost when the
local government is active in poverty alleviation but other
entities do not cooperate.
As for the social organizations, W1 refers to the basic
benefits brought by targeted poverty alleviation when
selecting cooperative strategies for social organizations, such
as increased opportunities and economic effects after pov-
erty alleviation; W2 is the cost for social organizations to
choose cooperation in the process of targeted poverty
alleviation, such as the support of time and funds for poor
groups to get rid of poverty; W3 refers to the support to
social organizations in choosing cooperation strategies for
local governments. At the same time, if social organizations
choose noncooperative strategies, negative benefits k1A1,
(1 − k1)A1 will be generated for themselves and the poor
groups (the negative benefits include opportunity costs and
other losses).
As for poverty groups, S1 is the basic benefits brought
by targeted poverty alleviation when choosing cooperative
strategies for poverty groups, such as increased economic
income and improved social recognition after poverty
alleviation; S2 refers to the cost of choosing cooperation
for the poor in the process of targeted poverty alleviation,
such as labour and time; S3 is the support for poverty
groups in choosing cooperative strategies for local gov-
ernments; S4 refers to the support given to poor groups in
choosing cooperative strategies for social organizations.
At the same time, if the poverty group chooses the
noncooperative strategy, it will generate negative benefits
(1 − k2)A2, k2A2 to social organizations and itself (the
negative benefits include opportunity costs and other
losses).
3.3. Construction of Payment Function. Based on the above
assumptions, the income matrix of local governments, social
organizations, and poverty groups can be obtained, as shown
in Table 4.
4. Evolutionary Stability Strategy Analysis
4.1. Construction of Revenue Function. Suppose that U11
represents the expected return when the local government
chooses the cooperative strategy,U12 represents the expected
return when the local government chooses the noncoop-
erative strategy, and U1 represents the average expected
return of the local government. According to the above
analysis, there are
Table 2: Definition of the poverty group.
Classification Specific conditions
Absolute poor )e annual per capita net income is less than 627 RMB
Relatively poor population Annual per capita net income is between 628 to 865 RMB
Low-income population Annual per capita net income is between 866 and 1205 RMB
General income and high income Annual per capita net income is more than 1205 RMB
Table 1: Classification of social organizations.
Definition Explanation
Competitive profit-making
organization
Usually a competitive profit-making organization consists of a productive, commercial, and service
organization; they pursue their own economic benefits in the market competition by establishing a good
organizational image to snatch customers, and profit is more obvious
Competitive nonprofit
organization
Usually competitive NPOs consist of a variety of professional academic research groups and have
almost no profit motive
An exclusive profit-making
organization
Generally, an exclusive profit-making organization is defined as an organization that has a large market
share in market competition; because of the uniqueness of the products or services it produces, it is
difficult for other organizations in its market to compete with it
Exclusive nonprofit organization Exclusive nonprofit organizations include government agencies and the military
6 Complexity
U11 � yz C1 − C2 + C3 − W3 − S3( ) + y(1 − z)
· C1 − C2 − W3( ) +(1 − y)z C1 − C2 − S3( )
+(1 − y)(1 − z) C1 − C2 − C4( ),
(1)
U12 � (1 − y)(1 − z) − C4( ), (2)
U1 � xU11 +(1 − x)U12 � xyz C1 − C2 + C3 − W3 − S3( )
+ xy(1 − z) C1 − C2 − W3( ) + x(1 − y)z
· C1 − C2 − S3( ) + x(1 − y)(1 − z) C1 − C2 − C4( )
+(1 − x)(1 − y)(1 − z) − C4( ).
(3)
Suppose that U21 represents the expected return when
social organizations choose cooperative strategy, U22 rep-
resents the expected return when social organizations
choose noncooperative strategy, and U2 represents the av-
erage expected return of social organizations. According to
the above analysis, there are
U21 � xz W1 − W2 + W3 − S4( ) + x(1 − z) W1 − W2 + W3 − k2A2( ) +(1 − x)z W1 − W2 − S4( ) +(1 − x)
· (1 − z) W1 − W2 − k2A2( ),
U12 � xz − k1A1( ) + x(1 − z) − k1A1 − k2A2( ) +(1 − x)z − k1A1( ) +(1 − x)(1 − z) − k1A1 − k2A2( ),
U2 � yU21 +(1 − y)U22 � yxz W1 − W2 + W3 − S4( ) + yx(1 − z) W1 − W2 + W3 − k2A2( )
+ y(1 − x)z W1 − W2 − S4( ) + y(1 − x)(1 − z) W1 − W2 − k2A2( ) +(1 − y)xz − k1A1( )
+(1 − y)x(1 − z) − k1A1 − k2A2( ) +(1 − y)(1 − x)z − k1A1( ) +(1 − y)(1 − x)(1 − z) − k1A1 − k2A2( ).
(4)
Table 4: Game payment matrix between the three players.
Strategy combination Local governments Social organizations )e poverty group
(1, 1, 1) C1 − C2 + C3 − W3 − S3 W1 − W2 + W3 − S4 S1 − S2 + S3 + S4
(1, 1, 0) C1 − C2 − W3 W1 − W2 + W3 − k2A2 − (1 − k2)A2
(1, 0, 1) C1 − C2 − S3 − k1A1 S1 − S2 + S3 − (1 − k1)A1
(1, 0, 0) C1 − C2 − C4 − k1A1 − k2A2 − (1 − k1)A1 − (1 − k2)A2
(0, 1, 1) 0 W1 − W2 − S4 S1 − S2 + S4
(0, 1, 0) 0 W1 − W2 − k2A2 − (1 − k2)A2
(0, 0, 1) 0 − k1A1 S1 − S2 − (1 − k1)A1
(0, 0, 0) − C4 − k1A1 − k2A2 − (1 − k1)A1 − (1 − k2)A2
Table 3: Summary of influencing factors of targeted poverty alleviation and multiagent collaborative governance.
Scholar (year) Research subject Influence factor
Feng (2019) [61] Government and poverty groups
Government: cost of poverty alleviation, social impact, and extraincome in case of
negative
Poor groups: government subsidies, opportunity costs, and additional government
incentives
He (2019) [62] Government and enterprises inpoverty alleviation
Government: income of superior government and people, basic income of
government, cost of government support, and loss of government income
Enterprise: government subsidy, enterprise investment, government policy
support, basic income of enterprise, income from society of enterprise, and loss of
enterprise income
Zheng et al.
(2019) [63]
Two governments in ecological
poverty alleviation
Cost of poverty alleviation, positive benefit of active poverty alleviation, and
negative benefit of one party’s noncooperation
Huang et al.
(2019) [64] Government and enterprises
Government: subsidy perceived cost, reputation perception, and expectation loss
Enterprises: scale effect, government subsidy, and reputation loss
Yao and Liu
(2019) [65]
Grassroots organizations, helpers,
and poor groups Incentive strength, additional income, and loss of returning to poverty
Zhang et al.
(2019) [66]
Government and social
organizations
Government: guide cost, punishment, and reward
Social organization: cost and additional income
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Suppose that U31 represents the expected return when
the poverty group chooses the cooperative strategy, U32
represents the expected return when the poverty group
chooses the noncooperative strategy, and U3 represents the
average expected return of the average poor group.
According to the above analysis, there are
U32 � xy − 1 − k2( )A2[ ] + x(1 − y) − 1 − k1( )A1 − 1 − k2( )A2[ ] +(1 − x)y − 1 − k2( )A2[ ] +(1 − x)(1 − y)
· − 1 − k1( )A1 − 1 − k2( )A2[ ],
U31 � xy S1 − S2 + S3 + S4( ) + x(1 − y) S1 − S2 + S3 − 1 − k1( )A1[ ]
+(1 − x)y S1 − S2 + S4( ) +(1 − x)(1 − y) S1 − S2 − 1 − k1( )A1[ ],
U3 � zU31 +(1 − z)U32 � zxy S1 − S2 + S3 + S4( ) + zx(1 − y) S1 − S2 + S3 − 1 − k1( )A1[ ]
+ z(1 − x)y S1 − S2 + S4( ) + z(1 − x)(1 − y) S1 − S2 − 1 − k1( )A1[ ] +(1 − z)xy − 1 − k2( )A2[ ]
+(1 − z)x(1 − y) − 1 − k1( )A1 − 1 − k2( )A2[ ] +(1 − z)(1 − x)y − 1 − k2( )A2[ ]
+(1 − z)(1 − x)(1 − y) − 1 − k1( )A1 − 1 − k2( )A2[ ].
(5)
4.2. Dynamic Replication Equation for a 4ree-Party Game.
According to the Malthusian equation, the dynamic repli-
cation equation for the local government to choose coop-
erative strategy is as follows:
F1(x) �
dx
dt
� x U11 − U1( )
� x(1 − x) U11 − U12( )
� x(1 − x) C1 − C2 − yW3 − zS3 + yzC3[ ].
(6)
)e dynamic replication equation for social organization
to choose cooperative strategy is as follows:
F2(y) �
dy
dt
� y U21 − U2( )
� y(1 − y) U21 − U22( )
� y(1 − y) xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1[ ].
(7)
)e dynamic replication equation for cooperative
strategy among the poverty groups is as follows:
F3(z) �
dz
dt
� z U31 − U3( )
� z(1 − z) U31 − U32( )
� z(1 − z) xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + 1 − k2( )A2[ ].
(8)
)e following three-dimensional dynamic system (I) can
be obtained from the replicated dynamic equations of local
governments, social organizations, and poverty groups:
F1(x) � x(1 − x) C1 − C2 − yW3 − zS3 + yzC3[ ],
F2(y) � y(1 − y) xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1[ ],
F3(z) � z(1 − z) xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + 1 − k2( )A2[ ].




(9)
Theorem 1. 4e three-dimensional dynamic system (I)
mentioned above must have 23 � 8 pure strategic equilibrium
points, which are, respectively, (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (1, 0,
0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), and (0, 0, 0). Meanwhile, there
are six possible equilibrium points for a single pure strategy,
namely, (0, ((S2 − S1 − (1 − k2)A2)/S4), ((W1 − W2+ k1A1)/
S4)), (((− S1 + S2 − (1 − k2)A2)/S3), 0, ((C1 − C2)/S3)),
(((− W1 + W2 − k1A1)/W3), ((C1 − C2)/W3), 0), (1, ((− S3−
S1 + S2 − (1 − k2)A2)/S4), ((W3 + W1 − W2 + k1A1)/ S4)),
(((− S4 − S1 + S2 − (1 − k2)A2)/S3), 1, ((C1 − C2 − W3)/
(S3 − C3))), and (((S4 − W1 + W2 − k1A1)/W3), ((C1−
C2 − S3)/(W3 − C3)), 1). 4e first equilibrium point exists if
0< ((S2 − S1 − (1 − k2)A2)/S4)< 1 and 0< ((W1 − W2+
k1A1)/S4)< 1. 4e conditions for the existence of other
equilibrium points can be obtained.
Proof. For the three-dimensional dynamic system, if x � 0
or x � 1, y � 0 or y � 1, and z � 0 or z � 1, there will be
F1(x) � 0, F2(y) � 0, andF3(z) � 0. )erefore, (1, 1, 1), (1,
1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), and (0, 0, 0)
are the equilibrium points for the system. If x � 0, 0<y< 1,
and 0< z< 1, when − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1 � 0 and
yS4 + S1 − S2 + (1 − k2)A2 � 0, then there is
F1(x) � 0, F2(y) � 0, andF3(z) � 0.)erefore, if 0< ((S2 −
S1 − (1 − k2)A2)/S4)< 1 and 0< ((W1 − W2 + k1A1)/S4)< 1,
then (0, ((S2 − S1 − (1 − k2)A2)/S4), ((W1 − W2 + k1A1)/
S4)) is the equilibrium point of the three-dimensional dy-
namical system. Similarly, the equilibrium points of the
other 5 single pure strategies can be proved. □
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Theorem 2. 4ere may be one equilibrium point (x∗, y∗, z∗)
of hybrid strategy in a three-dimensional dynamic system (I),
which satisfies (x∗, y∗, z∗) ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. For a three-dimensional dynamic system (I), if
0< x< 1, 0<y< 1, and 0< z< 1, when C1 − C2−
yW3 − zS3 + yzC3 � 0, xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1 � 0,
and xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + (1 − k2)A2 � 0, then there is
F1(x) � 0, F2(y) � 0, andF3(z) � 0. Solve equation (1) and
(x∗, y∗, z∗) can be obtained, which is the possible equi-
librium point of the three-dimensional dynamic system (I):
C1 − C2 − yW3 − zS3 + yzC3 � 0,
xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1 � 0,
xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + 1 − k2( )A2 � 0.



(10)□
4.3. Stability Analysis of Evolutionary Game. According to
the above analysis, the financial support of the superior
government, the negative return caused by noncooperation,
and the difference between their own benefits and costs are
the key factors influencing the game behaviour choice of the
three parties.
In order to analyze the asymptotic stability of the tripartite
main body, take the derivative of each replicate dynamic
equation of the three-dimensional dynamic system (I), then
F1′(x) � (1 − 2x) C1 − C2 − yW3 − zS3 + yzC3[ ],
F2′(y) � (1 − 2y) xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1[ ],
F3′(z) � (1 − 2z) xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + 1 − k2( )A2[ ].




(11)
According to the basic nature of the evolutionary game,
(x∗, y∗, z∗) is substituted in formula (2). When
F1′(x)< 0, F2′(y)< 0, F3′(z)< 0, (x∗, y∗, z∗) are the stable
strategies that should be adopted by local governments,
social organizations, and poverty groups.)e following is an
analysis of the asymptotic stability of the three-party game
players.
(1) Analysis on the gradual stability of local
governments:
If C1 − C2 − yW3 − zS3 + yzC3 � 0, then there is
F1(x) ≡ 0. )at is to say, the local government’s
strategic choices are stable, that is, the proportion of
local government’s strategic choices will not change
with the time passing by.
If C1 − C2 − yW3 − zS3 + yzC3 > 0, let F1(x) � 0,
and x � 0 and x � 1 are the two stable points for x. It
can be obtained from equation (2) that the derivative
of F1(x) is F1′(x) � (1 − 2x)[C1 − C2 − yW3−
zS3 + yzC3]. )ere is F1′(0)> 0, F1′(1)< 0. )erefore,
x � 1 is the equilibrium points of the strategies of
local governments. )is means that the support
provided by the superior government and the ex-
ternal benefits of local governments C1 and C3, when
the three main bodies are active in poverty allevia-
tion, the support of local governments to social
organizations and poverty groups S3 and W3, and the
costs that local governments need to pay in the
process of targeted poverty alleviation C2 are im-
portant factors influencing the strategic choice of
local governments.)e support of local governments
for social organizations and poor groups S3 and W3
is the focus that local governments should consider.
At this time, the support for social organizations and
poverty groups may be rewarded in various ways
through poverty alleviation, but at this time, local
governments only consider the loss of interest in the
game process. Obviously, the local government is
always cautious in the process of strategy selection. If
the local government believes that the support for
social organizations and poverty groups is beyond its
means, it will prompt the local government to choose
the noncooperative strategy.
Similarly, if C1 − C2 − yW3 − zS3 + yzC3 < 0, then
F1′(0)< 0 and F1′(1)> 0, so x � 0 is the equilibrium
points of the local government strategy. )is shows
that the income gained by the local governments to
choose cooperation when the higher-level govern-
ment support and incentives less than the extra-
income of noncooperative strategy. )at is to say, at
this time, the support and externality benefit from
the government at a higher level are not enough to
make up for its poverty alleviation costs (costs,
support for the organization, and society), the
noncooperative strategy is the evolutionary stable
strategy of the local government.
(2) Analysis of the progressive stability of social
organizations:
If xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1 � 0, then there is
F2(y) ≡ 0, that is to say, the social organization’s
strategic choice is at a stable state, that is, the pro-
portion of social organization’s strategic choice will
not change with the time going by.
If xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1 > 0, let F2(y) � 0,
then y � 0 and y � 1 are two stable points. At this
point, it can be seen from equation (2) that the
derivative of F2(y) is F2′(y) � (1 − 2y)[xW3 − zS4 +
W1 − W2 + k1A1] and F2′(0)> 0 and F2′(1)< 0.
)erefore, y � 1 is the equilibrium point of social
organization strategy. )is shows that the local
government’s support for social organizations W3,
the basic benefits W1 gained by social organizations
when they choose to help the poverty, the support of
social organizations S4 when they choose to coop-
erate with poor groups and the cost of poverty al-
leviation W2, and the loss of opportunity cost k1A1
when they do not cooperate in poverty alleviation are
very important factors influencing the strategic
choice of social organizations. In fact, in the process
of targeted poverty alleviation, the cost of poverty
alleviation paid by social organizations is not high,
while once the poor groups get rid of poverty, the
benefits of social organizations are various.
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)erefore, it is worth paying attention to the es-
tablishment of an appropriate antipoverty incentive
mechanism for social organizations.
Similarly, if xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1 < 0, then
F2′(0)< 0 and F2′(1)> 0, so y � 0 is the balance point
of social organization strategy. )is shows that the
income gained by the social organization choose
cooperation (local government support, their basic
income, poverty alleviation, and no cooperation
opportunity cost) is less than noncooperative
extraincome. )at is to say, at this point, the local
government for their support and their basic income
is insufficient to make up for its poverty alleviation
costs (costs support for poverty), and the nonco-
operative strategy is the evolutionary stable strategy
of local government.
(3) Analysis of the gradual stability of poverty groups:
If xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + (1 − k2)A2 � 0, then there is
F3(z) ≡ 0. )at is to say, the poverty group’s stra-
tegic choice is in a stable state, that is, the proportion
of the poverty group’s strategic choice will not
change with the passage of time.
If xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + (1 − k2)A2 > 0, let F3(z) � 0,
then z � 0 and z � 1 are the two stable points of z. At
this point, the derivative of F3(z) from equation (2)
is F3′(z) � (1 − 2z)[xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + (1 − k2)
A2]. )ere is F3′(0)> 0 and F3′(1)< 0. )erefore, z �
1 is the equilibrium point of the strategy of the
poverty group. )is shows that the support of local
governments and social organizations for poverty
groups S3 and S4, the basic benefits S1 gained by poor
groups when they choose to help the poor, the cost of
poverty alleviation S2, and the loss of opportunity
cost (1 − k2)A2 when they do not cooperate in
poverty alleviation are important factors influencing
the strategic choice of poverty groups. Poverty
groups play a very important role in the process of
poverty alleviation, and the basic income and the
impact of strategy selection are inseparable with local
government and social organizations. )erefore, the
basic income of the poverty group, local government,
and social organizations play an important role in
the targeted poverty alleviation.
Similarly, if xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + (1 − k2)A2 < 0,
then F3′(0)< 0 and F3′(1)> 0, so z � 0 is the equi-
librium point of the strategy of the poverty group. It
shows that the income gained by the poverty
choosing cooperative strategy (the support of local
government and social organizations, their basic
income from poverty alleviation, and opportunity
cost from noncooperative strategy) is less than the
extra income from noncooperative strategy. When
the local government and social organizations for
their support and their basic income are not enough
to make up for its poverty alleviation costs (costs),
the cooperation strategy is poor at this time from the
evolutionary stable strategy.
Combined the initial states and strategy choices if local
government and poverty, when C1 − C2 − yW3− zS3+
yzC3 > 0, xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2 + (1 − k2)A2 < 0, while the
support from the local government is more important to
both local government and the poverty groups, as long as the
local government can help reduce costs for poverty alleviation
poverty group, at the same time increase the opportunity cost
the poverty groups choose noncooperative strategy, and it will
promote the cooperative strategy selection of local govern-
ments and poverty groups. As a matter of fact, the financial
support from local governments can play a role for poverty
alleviation in a certain stage, and it is not a long-term solution.
Local governments should be committed to helping poor
groups reduce the cost of poverty alleviation and, at the same
time, build incentive mechanisms including policies to con-
tinue to enjoy the benefits after “lifting off the poverty cap”.
Combining the initial states with strategic choices of
social organizations and poverty groups, when
xW3 − zS4 + W1 − W2 + k1A1 > 0, xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2+
(1 − k2)A2 > 0, the opportunity cost of the targeted antipoverty
noncooperative strategy has a great impact on the strategic
choice of both sides. )erefore, targeted poverty alleviation
cooperation between social organizations and poverty groups
can reduce the loss of opportunity cost.Meanwhile, the support
of local governments is also the key to the realization of targeted
poverty alleviation cooperation between social organizations
and poor groups. )erefore, it is urgent to establish a precise
cooperation mechanism for poverty alleviation with local
government as the leading role, social organizations as the
guide, and poor groups as the main body.
5. Numerical Simulation and Simulation
Relevant parameters were set through the research
group’s statistical data of the questionnaire survey for the
third-party assessment of targeted poverty alleviation in
Xinjiang in 2018. Xinjiang is a contiguous poverty-
stricken region designated by the state, and the four
prefectures in southern Xinjiang are among the three
regions and three prefectures designated by the state for
poverty alleviation.
At present, there are 588.7 thousand households, 2.3147
million poverty people, 2,131 poverty villages, and 13
counties broken away from poverty at the end of 2018, which
has decreased the poverty household to 204.4 thousand, the
poverty population to 817.1 thousand, the poverty villages to
1,537, and the poverty counties to 22. In this paper, taking a
county as an example, the calculation results of various
parameters are as shown in Table 5.
(1) )e influence of initial willingness to cooperate on
the evolutionary path of multiagent collaborative
governance:
According to the above analysis, the initial willing-
ness of multiagent cooperation will influence the
final evolution path. )rough the simulation of
survey data, it can be found that, for a fixed value x,
no matter what the value of y and z is, there are
always duplicating dynamic equations of social
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organizations and poverty groups xW3− zS4+
W1 − W2 + k1A1 < 0, and xS3 + yS4 + S1 − S2+
(1 − k2)A2 < 0. )at is to say, only the cooperative
willingness of local governments will have an impact
on the final evolution path. According to the survey,
there are about 50% social organizations and poverty
groups are willing to cooperate, that is,
y � 0.5 and z � 0.5. )e influence of the evolution
result of multiagent collaborative governance and
initial willingness to cooperate on a single subject is
shown in Figures 2 and 3.
As can be seen from Figure 2, if the initial coop-
erative intention of local governments x is taken at
any value, the evolution result of multiagent col-
laborative governance is (1, 0, 0). )at is, the gov-
ernment actively participates, social organizations do
not participate, and the poor population actively
participate in poverty alleviation. Obviously, this is
not enough to achieve China’s 2020 goal of poverty
alleviation. As can be seen in Figure 3, the impact on
a single subject does not change much, nor does the
final cooperation strategy change.
Set y � 0.5 and z � 0.5, the value of x will change as
follows. (1) )e evolution curve of the value x finally
gets to 1, which indicates that the change of the value
of x shows a monotonic rising trend, the rising speed
gradually weakens as time goes on, and the end point
of the final evolution is the active cooperation of local
governments. )is shows that, in the process of
multisubject collaborative governance for targeted
poverty alleviation, various national and local poli-
cies can ensure that local governments always take
the completion of targeted poverty alleviation tasks
as the basic goal. (2) )e evolution curve of the value
y finally gets to 0, which indicates that the change of
value of y shows a monotony downward trend, and
the decline rate gradually weakens with the passage
of time. )e end point of the final evolution is that
social organizations do not participate in poverty
alleviation. )is shows the initial local government
policies do not affect social organizations in poverty
alleviation. Because of its own interests, it was not
involved in poverty reduction motives. Of course,
once the government extends enough support to the
social organizations for poverty alleviation in re-
wards and punishment mechanism, it will take the
initiative to choose to participate in poverty allevi-
ation. )e evolution curve of the value is obtained,
which finally evolves to 0, indicating that the change
of the value presents a monotony downward trend,
and the decline rate gradually weakens with the
passage of time, and the end point of the final
evolution is the negative cooperation of the poor
population. (3) )e evolution curve of the value z
finally gets to 0, which indicates that there is a
monotonic decline in the value z, and the rate of
decline tapered off over time. )e end point of
evolution is the passive cooperation of poverty.
)erefore, at present, the targeted multisubject
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Figure 2: )e influence of local governments’ initial cooperative
willingness on the evolutionary path when y � 0.5 and z � 0.5.
Table 5: Related data statistics in X country, Xinjiang (ten thousand RMB).
Parameters Implications Value
C1 )e support provided by the superior government when the local government is active in poverty alleviation 1,200
C2 )e cost local governments need to pay in the process of targeted poverty alleviation 560
C3
)e external benefits brought by local governments due to poverty alleviation when the three parties are active in
poverty alleviation 890
C4
)e loss of opportunity costs when local governments are active in poverty alleviation but other players do not
cooperate 650
W1 )e basic benefits of targeted poverty alleviation when social organizations choose cooperative strategies 100
W2 )e cost of cooperation among social organizations in the process of targeted poverty alleviation 450
W3 )e support given by local governments to social organizations in choosing cooperative strategies 300
k1A1 Negative returns caused by social organizations to choose the strategy of noncooperative strategy 20
S1 )e basic benefits of targeted poverty alleviation when poverty groups choose cooperative strategies 200
S2 )e cost of cooperation among poverty groups in the process of targeted poverty alleviation 1100
S3 )e support given by local governments to poverty groups in choosing cooperative strategies 400
S4 )e support given by social organizations to poverty groups in choosing cooperative strategies 300
(1 − k2)A2 )e negative return caused by the poverty group chooses not to cooperate the strategy 200
Data source: the third party assessment questionnaire data statistics in Xinjiang targeted poverty alleviation in 2018.
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collaborative governance for poverty alleviation in a
county in Xinjiang is not in the Pareto optimal state,
and more powerful measures and policies are needed
to promote the realization of the goal of multisubject
collaborative governance.
(2) Whether increasing support for each participant will
affect the evolution of tripartite competition:
According to the relevant theoretical analysis, the
support strength of each participant will have an impact
on the dynamic replication equation of the evolutionary
game, thus affecting the final evolutionary equilibrium
result. )is part is taken x � 0.5, y � 0.5, and z � 0.5
as the initial cooperative intention to study the influence
of improving C1, S3, S4, and W3 on the final evolution
result, as shown in Figures 4–9.
As can be seen from Figures 4 and 5, improving the
support provided by the higher level government for
the local government’s active poverty alleviation C1
will not promote tripartite cooperation. )is con-
clusion is not consistent with the general cognition.
For local governments, the support from the supe-
rior government will be the main benefit due to the
consideration of their own costs and risks, but social
organizations and poor groups are not sensitive to
the support from the superior government.
With the increase of C1, the efficiency of the active
cooperation of local government is improved, but the
cooperative behaviour of social organizations and
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Figure 4: )e influence of increasing C1 on the evolution path of
multiagent collaborative governance when
x � 0.5, y � 0.5, and z � 0.5.
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Figure 3: )e influence of local government’s initial cooperative willingness on the single subjects if y � 0.5 and z � 0.5.
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poverty groups is not promoted, due to the fact that
the subsidies from the superior government do not
encourage and stimulate endogenous impetus of
poverty groups. )erefore, in the process of targeted
poverty alleviation, the role of the government
should be transformed to avoid the disadvantages of
top-down one-way poverty alleviation and build a
poverty alleviation framework with the participation
of multiple subjects.
It can be seen from Figures 6 and 7 that the im-
provement of local government’s support for the
poverty groups S3 and social organizations’ support
for the poverty groups S4 will promote the positive
cooperation of the poverty groups. )is is consistent
with the results of the literature [61, 62, 64]. Com-
pared with the evolution path in Figure 3, the
evolution path of the local government does not
change a lot, but due to paying a certain cost, the
evolution velocity of social organization to zero
steady-state increases with the increase of its support
from the poverty group. When the support from the
local government and social organizations increases,
the benefits obtained by the poverty groups will
increase. At the same time, the increase of local
governments and social organizations’ support for
poverty groups makes the poverty alleviation drive of
the poverty groups appear. When the support rea-
ches a certain level, the poverty groups turn from
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Figure 7: )e influence of increasing S3 and S4 on the single agent when x � 0.5, y � 0.5, and z � 0.5.
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passive poverty alleviation strategies to active pov-
erty alleviation. )erefore, it can be believed that the
enhancement of support from local governments
and social organizations can effectively promote the
conversion of cooperation willingness of the poor
groups, such as providing jobs, increasing relevant
subsidies, and providing technical service guidance,
which are all positive incentive measures for the
poverty groups.
It can be seen from Figures 8 and 9 that when im-
proving the local government support for social
organizationsW3, social organizations do not choose
cooperative strategy. )e main reason is that, on the
one hand, social organizations exert certain subsidies
to the poverty group; on the other hand, the local
government gives insufficient support to social or-
ganizations. )erefore, the support of governments
towards social organizations should be improved.
Relevant data found that the financial support of
foreign governments to social organizations is
strong. It can be said that governments are still the
main source of funds for the survival and develop-
ment of social organizations. For example, according
to professor Salamon’s research, the financial sup-
port of the US government to social organizations
was as high as 30.5% in 1995, making it the second
largest source of funds for social organizations after
service charges. Services and fees accounted for 44%
of the revenues of social organizations in the UK in
1995, donations for 9%, and government grants for
47%. Moreover, in the 10 years from 1991 to 2001, the
income of social organizations increased by 40% from
the government, while the overall income of social
organizations increased by 32%. Among the developed
countries in Europe, the Netherlands is also a typical
country that relies on government financial support
for the operation of social organizations. )e Neth-
erlands has a huge social organization, spending 15%
of GDP; Employment accounts for 12.6 per cent of the
country’s nonagricultural workforce, yet only 39% of
its total income comes from service fees, 10% from
charitable donations and as much as 59% from gov-
ernment financial support. Although there are no valid
statistics in Singapore, the government’s support for
social organizations has been recognized by the society
under the model of government-led construction of
social organizations. )erefore, in the process of
multisubject-targeted poverty alleviation collaborative
governance in China, the government also needs to
increase its support for social organizations.
(3) Whether increasing the negative income of social
organizations and poverty groups will affect the
evolution of tripartite competition:
Social organizations and poverty groups adopt
strategies (nonparticipation and negative) and
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negative earnings K1A1, (1 − K1)A1, K2A2, and (1 −
K2)A2 will be produced. If they found noncooper-
ative strategy does harm to their own interests, they
will eventually choose the cooperative strategy with
the increase of loss. )erefore, to some extent, the
increase of negative earnings will promote the be-
haviour positive cooperation. )is part is still taken
x � 0.5, y � 0.5, and z � 0.5 as the initial coopera-
tive intention to study the influence of improvement
on the final evolution result, as shown in Figures 10
and 11.
It can be seen from Figures 10 and 11 that, with the
increase of negative returns of social organizations
and groups, the evolution path of the local gov-
ernment did not have the too big change, while
social organizations tend to take cooperative
strategies. In the initial stage of evolution, social
organizations are not involved in poverty allevia-
tion. With the increase of evolution and negative
returns, social organizations will choose to partic-
ipate in poverty alleviation. As for the poverty
groups, inactive participation in poverty alleviation
will lead to environment worsening and resources
shortage so that the poverty groups will become
much poorer. )erefore, negative poverty allevia-
tion has a significant impact on the benefits gained
by the poverty group. Once the negative earnings or
opportunity cost of negative poverty alleviation
reaches a certain threshold, the poverty groups will
choose the positive strategy from consideration of
self-interest optimal. )erefore, the negative in-
come of social organizations and poverty groups
plays a positive role in the multisubject collabo-
rative governance of targeted poverty alleviation.
(4) Whether increasing the basic economic benefits of
social organizations and poverty groups will affect
the evolution of tripartite competition and
cooperation:
According to relevant theoretical analysis, in the
case of local government incentives, the increase of
basic economic benefits W1 and income of social
organizations and poverty groups S1 will affect the
replication of the dynamic equation, thus influ-
encing the final evolutionary equilibrium result.)e
related research also shows the correctness of this
paper [65, 66]. )is part still takes
x � 0.5, y � 0.5, and z � 0.5 as the initial coopera-
tive intention to study the influence of improving
W1 and S1 on the final evolution results, as shown in
Figures 12 and 13. It can be seen from Figure 12 that
the increase of basic economic benefits W1 and
income of social organizations and poverty groups
S1 will affect the evolutionary equilibrium result,
from (1, 0, 0)⟶ (1, 0, 1)⟶ (1, 1, 1). As can be
seen from Figure 13, with the increase of W1 and S1,
the evolution result of local governments has not
changed significantly because local governments
have been in a state of stimulating poverty allevi-
ation through policies. At this point, social orga-
nizations can obtain more benefits due to the
increase of basic benefits W1. However, when the
benefits are within a certain range, the strategic
selection of social organizations is always in a state
of fluctuation and does not reach the equilibrium
point. When W1 reaches about 500, the strategic
choice of social organizations no longer fluctuates,
but finally approaches 1. For the poverty group, the
speed of reaching the equilibrium state is much
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higher than that of social organizations because, for
the poverty group, the improvement of its income
will greatly stimulate the long-term economic and
social effects. At the same time, under the guidance
of external policies and targeted poverty alleviation
policies, it will spare no effort to achieve the goal of
poverty alleviation. )erefore, the increasing the
basic economic benefits of both sides can eliminate
regional poverty and gradually realize the goal of
comprehensive poverty alleviation.
6. Conclusion
Precise poverty alleviation work is a wide-ranging, huge-
investment, and complex-situation system engineering, with
dynamic, multidimensional, relativity, and diversity char-
acteristics, involving many relevant interest groups [61–66].
Under the condition of limited rationality, this paper studies
the evolutionary game model of multiagent collaborative
governance of local governments, social organizations, and
poor groups in the process of targeted poverty alleviation.
)rough the analysis of evolutionary stability strategies, we
obtain the support of social organizations and local gov-
ernments, the cooperative benefits of social organizations
and poor groups, and the negative benefits of noncooper-
ation between social organizations and poor groups are the
key factors that affect the cooperation of tripartite evolu-
tionary games. Different from the existing related research,
this paper uses the survey data and the actual interview data
to make a dynamic evolution analysis on the strategy choice
of local government, social organizations, and the poor
groups and simulates the path of different stakeholders to
form the interest balance in the real situation. )e main
contribution of this article is to be able to choose model
setting and simulate realistic effects from a multiagent
collaborative governance equilibrium strategy more prac-
tically and fully demonstrate the actual situation of poverty
alleviation work in a county in Xinjiang.
)e main conclusions are as follows:
(1) Increasing the support of social organizations and
local governments will affect the evolution of tri-
partite competition, but the support should be ap-
propriate, too much blood transfusion-type support
from the higher government cannot promote pov-
erty alleviation groups to maintain the active poverty
alleviation state and poverty groups to maintain
active poverty alleviation state. )erefore, the higher
level government should adopt the gradient strategy
to reduce direct input, strive for the rational allo-
cation of resources to maximize the effectiveness,
and avoid the waste of resources.
(2) Increasing the negative benefits of social organizations
and poverty groups will affect the evolution of tri-
partite competition. As rational people, each game
subject will try to reduce their own losses. If the
negative return (penalty) is increased moderately, the
participants will consider the cost and choose the
cooperative strategy to pursue the benefit. )erefore,
moderately increasing the negative income of social
organizations and poverty groups can restrain the
behavioural strategies of both sides and promote the
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process of poverty alleviation. However, the appro-
priate range of punishment is still pending question.
(3) Increasing the basic economic benefits of social
organizations and poverty groups will significantly
affect the evolution of tripartite competition.
Whether poverty groups choose to actively lift
themselves out of poverty depends on the stimulus of
economic benefits brought by poverty alleviation.
)e social organizations in this paper belong to for-
profit organizations and are eager to use their own
advantages to get additional economic growth.
Considering the cost of poverty alleviation paid by
social organizations and giving reasonable com-
pensation to social organizations through some
policy incentives can promote the good operation of
social organizations.
)e above research conclusions have a certain reference
value for the multisubject collaborative governance of tar-
geted poverty alleviation. )e countermeasures and sug-
gestions are as follows. Firstly, we should clearly establish a
gradient subsidy support mechanism to avoid direct input.
Secondly, the participation of multiple agents is promoted by
means of a dual mechanism of punishment and incentive.
)irdly, the supervision and evaluation system of social
organizations should be improved to clearly define the
power and responsibility relationship between government
and social organizations. Fourthly, strengthen the publicity
and guidance of social organizations and institutional
buildings and actively respond to the participation of the
whole people in poverty alleviation. )is paper only con-
siders the evolutionary game model involved with three
parties, and the cooperative governance of more parties
should be further discussed in the future.
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